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why Some Muslim Countries are 
Democracies and Some are Not
Shaheen Mozaffar
the transitions to democracy in tunisia and egypt shortly after the popular uprisings of the arab Spring, and subsequently in Libya, 
provide an opportunity to test the empirical validity 
of the conventional wisdom that democracy cannot 
be established and sustained in Muslim countries. 
this article undertakes this task through a systematic 
comparative analysis of 56 countries classified as 
Muslim countries by virtue of their membership in the 
Organization of islamic Countries (OiC). it first maps 
variations in the incidence of democracy among the 56 
Muslim countries based on the widely used Freedom 
House rating (FHr, www.freedomhouse.org) of 
countries into “Free,” “Partly Free” and “Not Free.” 
it then presents the results of regression analyses to 
illustrate the importance of cross-national variations  
in (1) religious, ethnic and linguistic diversity, and  
(2) the political institutionalization of religion to 
explain why some Muslim countries are democracies 
and some are not.
Democracy in  
Muslim Countries:  
A Global Analysis
the data displayed in table 1 show  
that the majority (57%) of Muslim 
countries are either democracies or 
semi-democracies, with 7% classified 
as Free and 50% as Partly Free, while 
43% are not democracies. regional 
comparisons reveal that 73% of Muslim 
countries in Sub-Saharan africa 
(SSa) and 71% of Muslim countries in 
asia are either democracies or semi-
democracies. Of the three countries 
classified in the Other category, 
guyana and Suriname are democra-
cies and albania is a semi-democracy. 
and in the Middle east and North 
africa (MeNa), 33% of the countries 
are semi-democracies. the data also 
show, however, that 67% of the Muslim 
countries in MeNa, 67% in Central 
asia, 27% in SSa, and 29% in asia are 
not democracies. the Chi-Square value 
at the bottom of table 1 attests to the 
statistical significance of these results, 
meaning that they are not random.
table 2 presents the results of three 
regression models to explain the 
observed variations in the incidence 
of democracy in Muslim countries 
described above. the Social Model 
Freedom House Ratings Africa MENA Asia Central Asia Other Totals
Free
 9.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 66.7% 7.0%
 (N = 2) (N = 0) (N = 0) (N = 0) (N = 2) (N = 4)
Partly Free
 63.6% 33.3% 71.4% 33.3% 33.3% 50.0%
 (N =14) (N = 6) (N = 5) (N = 2) (N = 1) (N = 28)
Not Free
 27.3% 66.7% 28.6% 66.7% 0.0% 43.0%
 (N = 6) (N = 12) (N = 2) (N = 4) (N = 0) (N = 24)
Totals
 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
 (N = 22) (N = 18) (N = 7) (N = 6) (N = 3) (N = 56)
Table 1 – Democracy in Muslim Countries: A Global Comparison
X2 = 26.21 (sig. = .001)
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examines the impact of ethnic, linguis-
tic and religious diversity measured 
by quantitative indices (alesina et al., 
Journal of Economic Growth [2003]) that 
classify countries on each indicator 
of diversity on a scale from 0 (totally 
homogeneous) to 1 (totally heteroge-
neous). the regression analysis shows, 
counter-intuitively, that religious 
diversity has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on the incidence of 
democracy in Muslim countries. ethnic 
diversity has a negative impact and lin-
guistic diversity a positive impact, but 
neither effect is statistically significant.
the Political Model examines the 
impact of the institutionalization of 
religion; that is, the separation or fusion 
of state and religion as indicated by the 
extent of (a) government regulation of 
religion and (b) government favoritism 
of one religion over another. Both 
indicators are measured by quantitative 
indices (grim and Finke, Interdisciplinary 
Journal of Research on Religion [2006]) 
that classify countries on each indicator 
on a scale from 1 (low institutionaliza-
tion or separation of state and religion) 
to 10 (high institutionalization or 
fusion of state and religion). the regres-
sion analysis shows that the higher the 
fusion of state and religion the less likely 
a Muslim country will be a democracy, 
although the negative impact of gov-
ernment favoritism of one religion over 
another is statistically insignificant. 
However, its substantially high and 
statistically significant negative coeffi-
cient (-.455) indicates that government 
regulation of religion more severely 
reduces the prospect for democracy in a 
Muslim country.
the additive Model examines the 
combined effects of social diversity 
and institutionalization of religion. it 
reinforces the individual results of the 
previous two models. religious diver-
sity facilitates, while the fusion of state 
and religion hinders, the prospects for 
democracy in Muslim countries.
Implications
the data in table 1 show that the 
conventional wisdom that Muslim 
countries are inhospitable to democ-
racy is f latly wrong. Not only are 
most Muslim countries in the world 
democracies, but the world’s largest 
and second-largest Muslim countries, 
indonesia and Bangladesh, respec-
tively, are vibrant democracies. even in 
MeNa, a region widely believed to be 
Entries are standardized coefficients.  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  All statistically significant coefficients are in bold. 
*p  ≤  .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001. 
Variables Social Model Political Model Additive Model
Ethnic Diversity
 -.102  -.023
 (.06)  (.06)
Linguistic Diversity
 .167  .030
 (.05)  (.05)
Religious Diversity
  .398**   .298*
 (.08)  (.08)
Government Regulation of Religion
    -.455***  -.359**
  (.162) (.17)
Government Favoritism of Religion
  -.083 -.098
  (.16) (.17)
Constant
   1.132***   2.663***   2.211***
 (.18) (.29) (.40)
R2 .189 .246 .318
F  4.03**   8.63***   4.66***
N 56 56 56
Table 2 – The Impact of Social Diversity and Institutionalization of Religion on Democracy in Muslim Countries
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the one most inhospitable to democ-
racy, five of the six countries classified 
as semi-democracies are arab countries 
( Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, 
and yemen). the sixth, non-arab 
turkey, is the second-largest Muslim 
country in the region and has been 
governed by a democratically elected 
coalition of islamist parties for the past 
ten years. However, the data also con-
firm the fact that the democracy deficit 
in the Muslim world is not a Muslim 
deficit but an Arab deficit. all the 
MeNa countries classified as Not Free 
are arab countries, and they comprise 
fully half of the Muslim countries that 
are classified as Not Free.
the regression results in table 2 help 
explain why the conventional wisdom 
is wrong and why some Muslim coun-
tries are democracies and some are not. 
the conventional wisdom assumes a 
ref lexive congruence between cul-
ture and behavior that produces the 
egregiously f lawed and empirically 
false view of religion as the overriding 
source of politics. the Social Model, 
however, suggests the salience of other 
social variables such as ethnicity and 
language as alternative sources of poli-
tics. it thus highlights the importance 
of cross-cutting interactions between 
ethnicity, language and religion in 
creating multiple, contingent and 
strategic sources and opportunities for 
people to define their political interests 
and organize their political behavior, 
thereby mitigating the exaggerated 
social salience and political relevance 
incorrectly attributed to religion in 
conventional wisdom. Herein lies 
the key to the democratic success of 
Muslim countries in SSa and asia, all 
of which feature high levels of ethnic 
and linguistic diversity that override 
religious divisions. Social diversity, in 
other words, bolsters democracy.
Herein also lies a partial but crucial 
explanation for the democracy deficit 
of arab and Central asian Muslim 
countries. arab countries are religiously 
and linguistically more homogenous, 
but just as ethnically diverse as Muslim 
countries elsewhere in the world. 
ethnicity, in fact, has greater social 
salience than religion in some arab 
countries, notably in iraq and Libya. 
yet, the high degree of institutionaliza-
tion of religion, which enables authori-
tarian arab states to use religion as a 
cost-effective political tool to suppress 
alternative forms of interest articula-
tion and political organization, severely 
vitiates the potential of ethnicity as a 
source of political mobilization. this 
combination of high social salience of 
religion in the context of marked ethnic 
and linguistic diversity and high insti-
tutionalization of religion also accounts 
for the democracy deficit of Muslim 
countries in Central asia. the fusion 
of state and religion, therefore, is not 
culturally determined, but a deliberate 
choice of rulers and the singular source 
of dictatorship and associated democ-
racy deficit in Muslim countries in 
MeNa and Central asia.
By contrast, the low social salience of 
religion associated with the moderating 
effects of ethnic and language diversity 
and low political institutionalization 
not only encourage religious pluralism, 
but also help to facilitate democracy 
in Muslim countries in SSa and asia. 
Moreover, even when a country such 
as indonesia imposes some restrictions 
on religion, as it did in 2009 to counter 
the threat of al-Qaeda-inspired ter-
rorism, they were insufficient to offset 
the positive effects of entrenched social 
diversity, especially religious pluralism, 
on the country’s democracy.
this article underscores the need 
to reject cultural explanations of 
democracy that permeate the conven-
tional wisdom about the relationship 
between democracy and islam. Such 
explanations are not only ideologi-
cally noxious, they grossly misconstrue 
the nature, origin and development 
of democracy in the modern world. 
the article stresses instead the impor-
tance of examining the relationship 
between democracy and islam through 
a conceptually sound, theoretically 
informed and empirically grounded 
analysis. Such an analysis clarifies 
how cross-national variations in social 
diversity and the institutionalization of 
religion, separately and jointly, estab-
lish a context in which people make 
rational political choices about the sorts 
of democracy they want.
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religious diversity facilitates, 
while the fusion of state and 
religion hinders, the prospects for 
democracy in Muslim countries.
